Manias Panics And Crashes Pdf Download

Because of their economic importance, international bond markets are thought to be the likely location for the operation of financial market pressures on emerging market (EM) government policy. An important but unresolved debate that runs through the literature is the relative importance of domestic factors specific to the country receiving the capital flows (pull factors), versus push factors exogenous to the receiving country, in driving portfolio flows to EMs. Through extensive interviews with financial market participants, and analysis of the financial press between January 2008 and 2013, this paper argues that not only were market participants fully aware of the importance of push factors over the cycle, but that their perceptions of the domestic fundamentals themselves were influenced by these push factors. The paper provides evidence on the micro-foundations of investment decision making that make investors susceptible to influence by the push factors, and adds to a growing body of evidence that financial market borrowing costs are even less in the control of emerging market governments than previously assumed, because even when investors pay attention to domestic fundamentals, their assessments can be divorced from reality. This means that government efforts to attract foreign capital through implementing investors' preferred policies may be ultimately futile.

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Manias panics and crashes in emerging markets: An empirical investigation of

the post-2008 crisis period

Natalya Naqvi

Assistant Professor in International Political Economy at the London School of

Economics, Department of International Relations.

Abstract: Because of their economic importance, international bond markets are thought to be the

likely location for the operation of financial market pressures on emerging market (EM) government

policy. An important but unresolved debate that runs through the literature is the relative importance of

domestic factors specific to the country receiving the capital flows (pull factors), versus push factors

exogenous to the receiving country, in driving portfolio flows to EMs. Through extensive interviews

with financial market participants, and analysis of the financial press between January 2008 and 2013,

this paper argues that not only were market participants fully aware of the importance of p ush factors

over the cycle, but that their perceptions of the domestic fundamentals themselves were influenced by

these push factors. The paper provides evidence on the micro-foundations of investment decision

making that make investors susceptible to influence by the push factors, and adds to a growing body of

evidence that financial market borrowing costs are even less in the control of emerging market

governments than previously assumed, because even when investors pay attention to domestic

fundamentals, their assessments can be divorced from reality. This means that government efforts to

attract foreign capital through implementing investors' preferred policies may be ultimately futile.

Accepted for publication in New Political Economy

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13563467.2018.1526263

Acknowledgements: Special thanks to Julia Gray, Peter Nolan, Gary Dymski, Gay Meeks, Robert

Keohane, Ivan Rajic, and Domna Michailidou and the participants of the New Directions in Money and

Finance Conference at the University of Pennsylvania, the Society for the Advancement of

Socioeconomics Early Career workshop at UC Berkeley, and the International Political Economy

Working Paper seminar at the University of Oxford, for comments on earlier versions of this paper.

Introduction:+the+importance+of+portfolio+flows+to+EM+governments+

Since the widespread liberalisation of capital accounts began in the 1980s,

private capital flows to emerging market (EM) 1 countries have surpassed official

flows, and gained paramount importance. Other trends, including the increasing

importance of institutional investors, and increased complexity of financial

instruments have had a profound impact on capital flows to EMs, and provoked an

increase in scholarly attention to the way in which financial markets work.

International government bond markets have long been considered to hold a special

status since price changes in these markets determine the cost and availability of EM

government's borrowing in hard currency. In the absence of the ability to borrow or

refinance on these markets, countries face the prospect of default, or resorting to IMF

assistance. High borrowing costs caused by investor exit can have significant

economy-wide consequences, causing a deterioration in both the government's fiscal

position and domestic bank balance sheets, as well as higher interest rates throughout

the rest of the economy which can affect investment and consumption decisions (De

Grauwe 2011; Gros 2012; Rommerskirchen 2015).

Sovereign bond markets therefore provide a most likely location for the

operation of financial market pressures on government policy (Mosley 2003; Hardie

2006; Hardie 2011). To maintain access to international bond markets at low interest

rates, governments need to take into account investors' policy preferences (Brooks et

al. 2015), which usually include tight monetary and fiscal policy in order to control

public debt and inflation, and other neoliberal reforms (Mosley 2000, 2003; Tomz and

Wright 2007; Lierse and Seelkopf 2016). This structural dependence (Lierse and

Seelkopf 2016; Strange 1996) of governments on bond markets has led scholars and

policy makers alike to decry the power of 'bond market vigilantes (Krugman 2009)

who impose their preferences on governments at the expense of the electorate. At the

same time, advocates of market discipline applaud the perceived ability of bond

markets to enforce sound policies (Helleiner 1995, 324; Rommerskirchen 2015).

Similarly, the IFIs regularly advise developing countries to adopt the policy mix

favoured by financial market investors in order to attract foreign capital and lower

their borrowing costs (Stiglitz 2005, 21). However, these arguments about financial

market constraint hinge on the market price actually reflecting domestic policies (pull

factors), rather than reflecting global factors exogenous to the country in question

(push factors), because in order for markets to punish policies they don't like, they

must actually be responsive to them in the first place2.

Relying on extensive interviews with market participants and examination of

the financial press, this paper argues that not only was the post-global financial crisis

(GFC ) investment boom into EM sovereign bonds driven by push factors, including

some not emphasised in existing literature such as crisis in unrelated markets that

offered a similar risk/return profile, but also that investors' perceptions of domestic

fundamentals (the pull factors) were themselves influenced by these push factors, and

so became divorced from reality. In addition to the macro-level push factors

themselves, the micro-foundations of investors' decision making, including investors'

reliance on heuristics and shortcuts, the ways in which investors used market data to

predict market reactions to changes in the push and pull factors, and the investment

mandates and business models of institutional investors, made investors even more

susceptible to the influence of push over pull factors.

This paper therefore contributes to a growing body of evidence that financial

market borrowing costs are even less in the control of emerging market governments

than previously assumed, because investors assessments of fundamentals can be, and

often are, divorced from reality. EM countries that try to attract capital through

adopting policies they think foreign investors prefer might find this strategy

ultimately futile.

Determinants of portfolio flows to EMs: The pull versus push factor framework

Ever since the seminal work of Calvo et al. (1993) which introduced the

framework in order to explain the rebound of capital inflows to Latin America after

the 1980s debt crisis, a central unresolved debate that runs through the vast literature

on the determinants of portfolio flows to emerging markets is the relative importance

of pull factors, or domestic factors specific to the country receiving the capital flows,

versus push factors exogenous to the receiving country. The difference is important

because if pull factors determine capital flows, the implication is that if EM

governments pursue the policies that international investors like, they can successfully

attract capital into their countries and lower their international borrowing costs.

However, if push factors are more important, this implies that attempts to attract

capital in order to reduce borrowing costs will ultimately be unsuccessful because

capital flows are determined by factors outside EM government's control.

Furthermore, the only way to mitigate the harmful effects of these volatile flows

would be to institute capital controls.

A number of studies find that pull factors determine portfolio flows into or out

of EMs. These can include the government's fiscal, monetary, and structural policies,

domestic macroeconomic variables such as debt ratios, external balances, foreign

exchange reserves, and GDP growth (Ahmed and Zlate 2013; De Vita and Kyaw

2008; Kim and Wu 2008; Duade and Fratzscher 2008), micropolicy indicators such as

the components of fiscal spending, sources of government revenue, and structure of

the pension system (Mosley 2003, 126), and even domestic political events such as

elections, ideology of the ruling party, or regime type (Martinez and Santiso 2003;

Vaaler et al. 2005; Bechtel 2009; Hardie 2006; Campello 2015).

Other studies argue that market prices do not accurately reflect country

fundamentals because portfolio flows are mostly dependent macro-level push factors,

largely exogenous to the country in question. Numerous studies have found cyclical

push factors have an effect, for example when AE interest rates, especially US interest

rates are low, capital flows to EMs where interest rates are generally higher, and vice

versa (Calvo et al. 1996; Eichengreen and Mody 1998; Fratzcher et al 2013; Koepke

2014; Dahlhaus and Vasishtha 2014). Because EM bonds are seen as riskier

investments than AE bonds, during boom periods when investors are less risk averse,

investment flows to EM assets, while during periods of risk aversion, investors

reallocate capital to safe haven assets in AEs (Milesi-Ferretti and Tille 2011; Forbes

and Warnock 2012; Broner et al. 2013; Ghosh et al 2014). More recent IPE literature

argues that EMs might not be constrained during boom periods, because global

liquidity is abundant and investors pay little to country specific policies. During bust

periods however, investors' negative reactions to left-wing policies have significant

consequences for EMs due to capital scarcity (Campello 2015).

Despite the exponential rise of AE institutional investors since the 1980s, with

the asset management industry intermediating assets amounting to $76 trillion (100%

of world GDP and 40% of global financial assets) as of 2015 (IMF 2015, 94), fewer

studies have paid attention to the micro-foundations of these investors' decision-

making behaviour, which cannot be fully captured by the pull-push factor framework

(Braun 2015, 2016; Koepke 2015, 19-20; Wullweber 2015). Hardie (2012) illustrates

that different types of investors have varied investment strategies and capacities for

exit, and therefore, have different implications for financial stability. Foreign

institutional investors in particular, are the most important actors in international

capital markets (Mosley 2003, 27) 3. According to IMF estimates, foreign asset

managers alone owned approximately 80% of all foreign held EM debt by 2012

(Arslanalp and Tsuda 2014, 19).

Within the foreign institutional investors category, more recent research tends

to follow Maxfield (1998)'s distinction between long-term, diversification4 oriented

investors which seek to balance their assets and liabilities, such as insurance and

pension funds, and so pay more attention to domestic fundamentals, and short-term

profit oriented investors such as mutual funds, hedge funds, and private wealth

managers that invest on the behalf of clients to which they promise competitive

yields, and so are influenced mainly by push factors (Hardie 2006; BIS 2007;

Tsatsaronis 2000; Gelos 2011; Raddatz and Schmukler 2012) 5. Studies have also

have found evidence of shorter term investors deviating from the fundamentals due to

herding behaviour, where it may be optimal (in profit terms) for investors to disregard

their private information and instead imitate the behaviour of their peers, and

contagion where problems in one EM country led investors to expect similar

problems in other EM countries, even when these had sound fundamentals (Kaminsky

Lyons and Schmukler 2001; Gelos 2011; Claessens and Forbes 2013). Other studies

highlight how due to information asymmetry or bounded rationality, investors rely on

heuristics or cognitive shortcuts such as sovereign ratings or category based

reasoning, instead of conducting detailed analysis of country-specific fundamentals

(Gray 2013; Gray and Hicks 2014; Brooks et al. 2015).

However, the literature continues to make contradictory findings on the

relative importance of pull versus push factors, which is unsurprising given results

depend on the way in which capital flows are measured, the country sample, time

period and data frequency used (see Koepke 2015). Most existing literature treats

pull factors and push factors as analytically distinct categories in order to measure

their relative importance, but does not pay sufficient attention to the interaction

between the two. In a globalised world, external developments can have a real impact

on domestic fundamentals, for example, portfolio inflows can significantly change

macroeconomic conditions and policy6. The push factors can also impact on how

investors interpret the pull factors, for example, global risk aversion could result in a

more negative interpretation of the same domestic fundamentals, and vice versa for

boom times. Nor is enough attention paid to the micro-foundations of investment

behaviour, despite its importance in understanding how investors form their

expectations of EM bond prices, and why investors might be prone to ignore or

misinterpret domestic fundamentals. With some exceptions (Brookes et al. 2015), it is

usually taken for granted that when investors do pay attention to pull factors, their

perceptions of these actually reflect material conditions

As financial markets are forward looking, prices depend not only on current

conditions, but also on future expectations of their evolution. Keynes, in his famous

beauty contest metaphor, argued that due to the future being unknowable in principle,

or 'fundamentally uncertain' (Keynes 1937, 217), financial market investors are

forced to 'speculate' or predict 'what average opinion expects the average opinion [of

other investors] to be' (Keynes 1936, 156) when making investment decisions.

Kindleberger builds on Keynes' work to show how financial markets have historically

gone through repeated cycles of 'mania, panic, and crash', where push factors such as

international liquidity cause asset prices to become over-inflated during the mania

phase, and undervalued during the panic phase (Kindleberger 1978). It is therefore

investors' perceptions of pull factors that are relevant in driving portfolio flows, not

the pull factors themselves, and even when investors do pay attention to the domestic

fundamentals, their interpretations of these could be influenced by push factors, and

divorced from reality.

These dynamics are illustrated through an examination of the drivers of

portfolio investment into EM bonds between 2008 and 2013, through one cycle of

panic and crash, following the GFC, and then mania after 2009. It is argued that while

the push factors changed dramatically over this period, no fundamental re-orientation

in policy direction occurred in major EMs during and after the crisis. During the crisis

period, capital outflows were driven by risk aversion due to developments in AEs.

During the mania period, rather than improved country fundamentals attracting

inflows, increased inflows that were pushed into EMs by a combination of macro-

level push factors contributed to an improvement in investors' expectations regarding

the fundamentals. Micro-level characteristics made investors more susceptible to the

influence of these macro-push factors, and encouraged investors to allocate their

portfolios according to their predictions of market movements rather than their

personal views of domestic fundamentals. Investors were not only aware of the

influence of push factors on market movements, but relied on various shortcuts and

heuristics to try and predict market opinion with regards to both push factors and

domestic fundamentals. Institutional investors' business models, which required them

to make a certain amount of profit to remain viable, and their investment mandates,

which forced them to follow ratings agencies, exacerbated pro-cyclicality. This was

the case not only for profit oriented short-term investors, but also diversification

oriented patient capital, as the distinction between the two became blurred in a low

interest rate environment.

Research methods

In order to enable a fine grained understanding of how push and pull factors

affect investment decisions, and how investors views of fundamentals evolved over

time, qualitative methods were favoured over quantitative, and depth over scope.

While quantitative methods give us valuable information about market movements,

they are unable to shed light on investors' motivations behind those outcomes. In-

depth, semi-structured interviews were preferred over other qualitative methods like

surveys because they allowed an understanding of investors' opinions and thought

processes at a level of granularity that surveys are rarely able to achieve, and

facilitated more accurate interpretation of data due to contextual information obtained

from face-to-face interviews (Lynch 2013; Mosley 2013, 6-7).

41 Semi-structured interviews with EM bond market participants were

conducted in Hong Kong, a major global financial centre for EM trading, and

Singapore, a regional hub for EM institutional investors, between 19/01/2013 and

11/04/2013 (See appendix 1 for a list of interviews). Due to the concentrated nature of

the industry, the largest investors, which were the most important in driving prices,

were targeted through snowballing, until the saturation point was reached. Interviews

focused on market participants based on relevant sales and trading desks in four major

investment banks who, as market makers, could give both their own views, as well as

those of their institutional investor clients7, thus making the interviews much more

representative than would have been possible by interviewing a similar number of

institutional investors. A smaller number of portfolio managers (PMs) at large and

medium sized institutional investors were interviewed in order to crosscheck the

information gained from investment bank interviewees.

In order to document how investors' perceptions of domestic fundamentals

changed over time, in addition to interviews, a comprehensive analysis of the

financial press between the period 01/01/2008, just before the GFC intensified, and

until interviews were conducted 19/01/2013, was conducted using Factiva8, analysing

over 170,000 words of text. These articles were supplemented by documents such as

bank research publications and memos, obtained from interviewees. This information

was triangulated with quantitative data on bond yield and market capitalization

movements for a number of well-known EM bond indices9, data on investment flows

where available10, and the relevant macroeconomic indicators.

EM inflows during and after the GFC: a full cycle of panic, crash, and

mania

After providing some context on the major EM investors during the time

period under consideration, as well as on how emerging markets have become

increasingly grouped together as an asset class, the following sections discuss how the

macro-level push factors, micro foundations of investment behaviour, as well as

investors' perceptions of domestic fundamentals, guided capital flows to EMs through

the cycle of panic, crash, and mania.

Who is 'the market'?

Figure 1. Major foreign investors in EM government bonds

Source: Interviews

Although exact breakdowns are not available11 , figure 1 identifies the most

important foreign investors in EM sovereign bonds for the period under study and

their relative time horizons for holding EM securities.

The global asset management industry is dominated by a small number of

large players. In 2012, the top five accounted for 18% of total assets under

management (AUM), with the largest player representing nearly 6% of the total

(Miyajima and Shim 2014). The largest asset managers involved in EM bonds include

PIMCO, Ashmore Group, Franklin Templeton Investments, Fidelity World Wide

Investment, Aberdeen Asset Management, and Bluebay Asset Management

(Interview 6, Investment Bank, Emerging Asia Sovereign Research). Important

differences within the mutual funds 12 category worth mentioning are 'crossover'

versus 'dedicated' investors, and 'open' and 'closed end' funds. While 'dedicated'

EM funds are constrained by their mandate to invest in EMs, and their performance is

'benchmarked' to an EM index, 'crossover' funds can invest across asset classes.

These funds can be either open end, which means that their clients can withdraw

funds whenever they feel the fund is underperforming, or closed end, in which the

clients cannot freely withdraw their funds13.

Although IMF reports suggest that dedicated and closed end funds should

provide more stability to EM markets because it is harder for them to move their

investments elsewhere during a crisis period (IMF 2004, 111; 2014, 70), the findings

presented in this paper suggest that even closed-end dedicated EM investors still have

the possibility for exit, because they can go 'underweight' the EM index by selling

EM securities and increasing their holdings of cash reserves (Interviews).

Contrary to the traditional distinction between short-term asset managers and

longer-term diversification oriented investors like pension and insurance funds,

interviewees pointed out that in practise, even the most conservative funds, but

especially defined benefit pension funds, allocate part of their capital to longer-term

safe investments, but then use the remainder to make risky short-term investments in

order to 'realise extra yield' (Interview 7, Investment Bank, EM Local Rates

Strategy). This is done by placing capital in shorter-term mutual funds or relying on

external investment consultants (ibid; Figure 1).

Other important investors include investment bank traders. Although

technically market-makers14, providing liquidity to the market and hedging their risk

rather than taking speculative positions, these traders indicated during interviews that

in practice, they can never completely hedge their risk, and end up speculating on

future price movements15. Newer investors in EM include foreign central banks,

sovereign wealth funds, and university endowment funds that invest their savings in

order to boost earnings, even though they have no client base requiring them to do so.

Financial innovations make it possible for even corporate non-financial

companies to invest in EMs countries in order to boost their profits. Investment banks,

though technically only supposed to help corporates with hedging foreign exchange

risk in EM, in fact help them gain exposure through derivatives to speculate on EM

interest rates, credit risk, or currencies. These trades were disguised as 'lowering

borrowing costs' (Interview 12, Investment Bank, Corporate Foreign Exchange Sales,

Interview 15, Investment Bank, China Corporate Financing).

Emerging markets as an asset class

Despite consisting of a large number of countries with diverse fundamentals,

EMs are increasingly invested in as a group or an 'asset class' by financial market

investors. This means that while some divergence between individual country yields

remains, EM bond yields have become increasingly correlated over time (Mauro et al

2002, McGuire and Schrijvers 2003), and have been especially so since the 2008

crisis (Arslanalp and Tsuda 2014; Miyajima and Shim 2014; IMF 2015). This has

been linked with the rise of the asset management industry, and increased importance

of institutional investors and their short-term profit motives, which increases demand

for easily definable categories to aid them in managing their portfolios (Gray 2013;

Miyajima and Shim 2014). In particular, the increased popularity of index-linked

investment, and the use of common indices by the largest EM investors, and

correlation between the main indices can lead them to adopt similar asset allocation

strategies, and thus to increased correlation between country yields (Miyajima and

Shim 2014).

Most EM investors benchmark their performance to an EM index, either being

'active' (trying to produce a higher yield than the index for their clients) 16, or

'passive' (mimicking the index exactly). 'Dedicated' EM funds are always

benchmarked to an index, while 'crossover' investors can still be connected to an

index even if they are not benchmarked to it, by asking their fund managers to beat a

particular index, or by using index derivatives to manage exposure to index member

countries (Interview 36, Investment advisory firm, PM). This means that many

investors decide to include 'EMs' as a whole, or through sub-indices, in their

portfolios without much regard for variations in country specific fundamentals within

the index (Interviews). Even small changes in the portfolio allocation of large

investors can have a major impact on EM prices due to the massive scale of their

investments relative to small and illiquid EM financial markets. Their behaviour also

has knock on effects through its effect on the sentiment of smaller investors

(Interview 6, Investment Bank, Emerging Asia Sovereign Research; Interview 33,

Investment Management Company, CEO), magnifying the importance of the major

indices relative to individual country fundamentals.

A small number of EM indices, which are themselves correlated, are used

widely (Miyajima and Shim 2014). For example, BIS estimates that two JPMorgan

EMBI Global indices are used for up to 34% of the total assets under management of

EM bond funds (Miyajima and Shim 2014, author's calculations) The most popular or

'benchmark' EM bond index is JP Morgan's hard currency Emerging Markets Bond

Index Global (EMBIG), which interviewees confirmed that the largest EM investors

all track closely. Inclusion in an index, which is usually dependent on sovereign

ratings17 , has an important automatic effect on the price of the bond in question as it

means an increased capital inflow into that bond, from all those investors

benchmarked to or investing in the index. Conversely, falling out of an index, as the

result of a ratings downgrade, means a huge capital outflow out of a country's bond

(Interviews).

Investors can also access sub-sections of the EM asset class category, which

are usually divided by risk perception. Local currency bonds, accessed through the JP

Morgan's local currency Government Bond Index-Emerging Markets (GBI-EM)

include additional currency and interest rate risk, while EM corporate bonds accessed

through JP Morgan's Corporate Emerging Markets Bonds Index (CEMBI) are

perceived as riskier than sovereign guaranteed debt, and EM equities accessed though

the MSCI EM are the riskiest. 'Frontier markets' consist of less developed countries,

with less established capital markets, and are considered even more risky than Ems

(Interview 11, Investment Bank, Local currency bond trader; Interview 32,

Investment Bank, EM credit research). Official regional divisions include Asia, Latin

America, Middle East and North Africa, Eastern Europe, although the major indices

are not usually divided by region (Interview 6, Investment Bank, Asia sovereign

research; Interview 7, Investment Bank, Latin America sovereign research).

The 2008 crisis: from mania to crash

Figure 2. Investor sentiment and investment into EM sovereign bond markets,

2007-2013

100#

150#

200#

250#

300#

350#

400#

450#

500#

550#

600#

10#

20#

30#

40#

50#

60#

70#

80#

90#

Millions'

VIX#index#

JPM#EMBIG#composite#market#

capitalisaFon#(USD#Mn.)##

(a)

Northern Rock

liquidity crisis

(Sept 2007)

(g)

(c)

Lehman Brothers

files for

Bankruptcy (Sept

2008)

(h)

Fed launches QE1

(Nov 2008)

(b)

(i)

BoE launches QE

(Mar 2009)

(m)

Greek bailout -

start of

Eurozone crisis

(May 2010)

(s)

(u)

Fed announces QE3

(Sept 2012)

(r)

S&P downgrades

US debt

(Aug 2011)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(j)

(q)

(n)

Fed launches QE2

(Nov 2010)

(l)

(k)

(o)

(p)

(t)

(a) Sept- 07: Northern Rock liquidity crisis; (b) Sept-08: US govt bailout of Freddie Max and

Fanny Mae; (c) Sept- 08: Lehman Brother files for bankruptcy; (d) Sept- 08: HBOS bailed out by

Lloyds; (e) Oct- 08: TARP pushed through Congress; (f) Oct- 08: Coordinated central bank rate

cut (including Fed, BoE, ECB); (g) Nov - 08: China announces fiscal stimulus; (h) Nov- 08: Fed

launches QE1; (i) Mar- 09: BoE launches QE; (j) Apr- 09: G20 agrees on global stimulus package

worth $5trn. commitment from the G20 group of countries to triple IMF's resources to $750bn;

(k) Oct- 09: True state of Greek finances revealed; (l) Apr- 09: Greek debt downgraded to junk;

(m) May- 10: Greek bailout - start of Eurozone crisis; (n) Nov- 10: Fed launches QE2; (o) Nov-

10: Irish bailout; (p) May- 11: ECB bails out Portugal; (q) Jul- 11: Second Greek bailout; (r) Aug-

11: S&P downgrades US debt ; (s) Dec- 11: ECB Longer Term Refinancing Operations (LTRO)

1st round; (t) Feb-12: ECB LTRO 2nd round; (u) Sept - 12: Fed announces QE3.

Source: Market capitalisation data for JPM EMBI Global Composite index

from Bloomberg, time line from FACTIVA; VIX CBOE Volatility Index from

Chicago Board Options Exchange

Note: The JP Morgan EMBIG is a widely used proxy for investment in

emerging markets18. The VIX index measures the implied volatility of S&P 500 index

options and is a widely used proxy for investor risk sentiment, with a high value

representing increased expectations of volatility, in other words, risk aversion.

Macro-level push factors

In the pre-crisis boom period, investment in EMs had been on a steady upward

trend, with market capitalization of the EMBIG rising by over 120% between 2000

and 2007, as investor sentiment remained positive (figure 2), with reports that EM

fundamentals as being 'much stronger today than they've been any recent time period

we can look at, given what's going on with exports, trade, current accounts and

economic growth' (Head of EM debt at JPMorgan Asset Management, cited in Casey

2008).

In late 2008, the GFC officially began with the bankruptcy of Lehman

Brothers on 15th September, and investors became risk averse, as shown by the

dramatic increase in the VIX and shifted their capital into safer AE assets. As a result,

EM prices fell dramatically (Figure 2, point c) .

Micro-foundations of investment behaviour

Investors were aware of the importance of macro-level push factors, and used

a set of indicators to measure them, in order to better predict market reactions.

According to interviews, they used certain high frequency data releases, such as US

consumer confidence, non-farm payrolls, and industrial production, and Chinese trade

data, as a proxy for global risk sentiment. Negative data releases during the post-

Lehman period indicated that other investors were becoming risk averse, and likely to

exit EMs, prompting further disinvestment (Interview 28, Investment Bank, USD EM

credit trader). Similarly, interviewees also directly kept track of 'fund flows', the

portfolio allocation decisions of other investors, especially the largest ones (Interview

6, Investment Bank, Emerging Asia Sovereign Research). According to interviewees,

this was done through word of mouth, reports on the financial news, and proprietary

data services that track fund flows, such as EPFR. During this time, mutual fund

flows reversed (IMF 2009), as cross-over investors left EMs altogether, while

dedicated EM funds saw 'unprecedented redemptions', and even closed-end EM

funds reduced their EM exposure, by going 'underweight' the EM index and

increasing their cash reserves (Griffin 2009; Interview 31, Investment Bank, EM

Sales). These reports sent negative signals to investors and triggered further outflows

(Interviews).

When they did assess the domestic fundamentals, most investors, including

investment bank traders, or fund portfolio managers tended to cover large numbers of

countries (up to 40 or 50), which combined with the large amounts of available

information, made it humanly impossible to have an in depth knowledge about each

one of them (Interviews)19. According to the CEO of an investment fund 'It is very

difficult for even sophisticated individuals to do a lot of research on the credit

worthiness or certain countries or certain companies. I don't care how smart you are,

its just impossible for you to do that much analysis' (Interview 33, Investment

Management Company, CEO). This forced investors to rely heavily on shortcuts and

heuristics, such internal rules for selling securities based on ratings downgrades, or

increases in CDS spreads. In particular, many funds are required by their mandate to

invest only in bonds that have investment-grade ratings fr om all the major ratings

agencies (Interviews).

The ratings agencies began to downgrade a number of EMs after September

2008: according to the chair of S&P's sovereign ratings committee 'If our analysis is

correct, this EM class as a whole has peaked in credit quality' (Litner 2008). Investors

were aware that ratings downgrades tended to follow rather than predict the fall in

EM bond prices: 'Rating agencies have to make a call. And often their call lags

where the market is at, even subprime can be rated AAA by them… We all know

there are limitations' (Interview 30, Investment Bank, Debt Capital Markets).

Nonetheless ratings remained a key heuristic for domestic fundamentals during the

crisis because of institutional investors' mandates: 'I followed very closely those EMs

borderline, about to become high yield if they were downgraded even one more notch.

That doesn't mean necessarily that's it's a bad credit, but what that means is that a lot

of funds have mandates where they can only invest in investment grade credit, so they

had to pull their money out [of EMs]… like on that day' (Interview 29, Investment

Bank, EM Credit Trader).

Interviewees also relied on more market based measures such as the credit

default swap spread to inform their analysis of country-specific sovereign default risk

'because, all the big guys [largest funds], they are trading the CDS, so that market

price is probably the best reflection of what people think about this credit' (Interview

33, Investment Management Company, CEO). During the crisis period, widening

CDS spreads20 were interpreted as deterioration in the fundamentals, as well as a

signal that large investors were selling off EM bonds, and that market sentiment was

turning negative (Interview 29, Investment Bank, EM Credit Trader).

While interviewees tracked news events that could affect EM prices on a daily

basis, this was done not just to form a personal opinion, but also in order to predict the

market reaction to the news event. One interviewee termed this phenomenon the

'BBC effect' saying that if a news story appeared on major outlets BBC, Reuters,

Bloomberg, or the FT, it immediately became important, as it was virtually

guaranteed that all international investors would hear about it, and thus it would have

an affect on prices. The interviewee also acknowledged that 'this is stupid because

there could be something big going on for three weeks and if it doesn't make the

international headlines then no one will know about it and it wont affect the market'

(Interview 2, Investment Bank, Sovereign Credit and CDS Trading). Therefore, even

if investors were aware of domestic fundamentals in great detail, their actual

investment strategy would only take into account those new events that 'moved the

market'. During the crisis period the most important news events centred around

details of the various bailout packages in the core economies (Interview 2, Investment

Bank, Sovereign Credit and CDS Trading; see figure 2). According to an investment

banker specializing in debt capital markets 'when there is a big crisis like we had in

2008, macro factors like the US and China and how they're doing impact the market,

the country is not the epicenter' (Interview 30, Investment Bank, Debt capital

markets).

This reliance on shortcuts, and the importance of the 'average opinion'

relative to personal opinions, made it easier for the push factors to influence the

interpretation of domestic pull factors themselves. The combination of negative data

releases for sentiment proxies, information on investment funds reallocating their

capital to safer assets, and deterioration of key heuristics like ratings and CDS

spreads, resulted in a negative feedback loop which caused EM prices to continue

falling, and causing sentiment to deteriorate further as prices continued falling.

Some investors did not believe that the drastic fall in prices reflected EM

country fundamentals. According to RBC Capital Markets21 'In this extreme global

financial stress environment, movements in emerging financial markets have been,

and should continue to be, driven by core market developments. In many cases,

moves have been inconsistent with fundamentals, and will very likely continue to

behave erratically until core markets stabilise' (Badawy 2008a). Despite their

personal views about fundamentals, investors were still forced to trade according to

the opinion of the 'average', or else make losses in the short term. Mutual funds could

not afford this because of their business models that promised short term competitive

returns to their clients. According to market analysts: 'Billions of dollars have been

taken out of these markets due to panic selling ', but, 'At times like these it is not

about the fundamental stories. It is about getting your money back' (Griffin 2008)22.

Investor perceptions of fundamentals during the crash

In accordance with the change in push factors, and amplified by the micro-

foundations of investment decision making, investors' interpretations of the domestic

fundamentals turned sharply negative during this time period. During the height of the

panic phase, in September 2008, investors stopped paying much attention to country

fundamentals altogether, reflected in a lack of reporting on EM domestic

fundamentals in the financial press.

By November 2008, when panic subsided and investors once again began

paying attention to the pull factors, EMs were said to be suffering from 'weaker

economic fundamentals - either current account deficits, or interventionist

government policies, or strong reliance on a single source of revenue' (Badawy

2008b), even though investors had been praising EM fundamentals only a few months

ago. It was widely feared that a decline in domestic demand in the advanced countries

would lead to a fall in EM exports, lower trade surpluses, and cause a growth slow-

down there as well (Griffin 2008; Oakley 2008). Latin American countries were seen

to be suffering from currency appreciation, inflation and weakening external balances

(Sivathambu 2008). Asian countries, which had been commended for their 'newfound

commitment to orthodox policies and stable prices' as recently as February 2008

(Casey 2008), were seen to have the 'most pronounced risks' as it was predicted that

'political controls and fiscal measures' would lead to 'greater distortions in the

longer-term' (Sivathambu 2008). There were also worries that Asia's trade surplus

was beginning to narrow since 2007 (Sivathambu 2008). Previously seen as an

advantage, over reliance on commodity exports was now seen as a major risk, as

analysts pointed out the negative impact a decline in commodity prices could have on

the real economy of commodity exporting EM countries (Badawy 2008b). Somewhat

contradictorily, at the same time as fears over slowing growth, inflation was seen by

some as 'the biggest threat' facing EMs (Sivathambu 2008).

From post-crisis recovery to the Eurozone Crisis: a mania in full swing (2009-2013)

Macro-level push factors

!

As has been well documented in the literature, at the macro-level, the

governments of major economies launched massive quantitative easing programs in

response to the GFC, which made large pools of cash available to investors, and

lowered AE interest rates. As risk sentiment gradually recovered, interest rate

differentials prompted AE investors to re-allocate this capital to higher interest rate

EM markets: according to Ashmore Group PLC23 'with yields in the developed world

either high for a good reason or yielding next to nothing, EM debt looks highly

attractive' (Ashmore Group PLC 2012). The recovery in EM bonds began towards

the end of 2008, when outflows began decelerating, and eventually reversing (figure

2), and the rally in EM bonds was considered to be in full swing by mid-2009

(Foundation and Endowment Money Management 2009).

When the Eurozone crisis officially struck with the Greek bailout in May

2010, global risk aversion triggered a sell-off in EM bonds as investors moved back

into AE safe assets (Figure 2 points m and r), just as they had during the 2008 crisis.

Despite overwhelmingly negative sentiment as shown by the repeated increases in the

VIX in figure 2, this sell-off proved to be remarkably short lived, unlike that during

200824 . Instead, investment into EMs accelerated (figure 2), as capital that had

previously been invested across different higher-yielding asset classes during the pre-

2007 boom became increasingly concentrated in EMs. Interviewees cited the

reallocation of capital from peripheral Eurozone to EM bonds as one of the main

drivers of price increases between 2010 and 2013. For example, according to an EM

bond trader:

'Prices are driven by people pulling money out of Europe, putting it into EMs… you

want some sort of return… you got all these investors looking for assets to park their

money… And that's what's been happening over the last several years, over the last two or

three years since the Eurozone crisis has intensified [2010-13]. Many of the EM countries

fundamentals are not improving and yet they are benefitting from this huge amount of roll- off

cash' (Interview 28, Investment Bank, USD EM Credit Trading).

Risk perceptions of EMs started to change accordingly, as AE financial assets

began to be seen as more risky. Investment banks' reports began to market EMs as an

asset class that possessed 'safe haven' characteristics, yet promised the necessary high

returns. According to an anonymous investment bank publication:

'2012 will be remembered as the year that EM fixed income [bonds] cemented its

position as a mainstream investment-grade asset class… EM sovereigns are now seen as a

flight-to-quality trade due to their strong balance sheet and net external creditor position…

providing equity-like total returns' (Anonymous Investment Bank 2012, 1- 3).

Micro-foundations of investment behaviour

Micro-level factors reinforced the concentration of capital in EMs. Soon after

investors withdrew capital from Peripheral Eurozone bonds en-mass as risk

perceptions of this asset class suddenly worsened, they found that their business

models still required them to make a higher return than would be possible by

investing in AE safe haven assets alone. An investment bank trader described the why

his asset manager clients moved into EMs: 'I need to make money, I need to earn

interest or face redemptions… basically because of the low interest rate

environment… people are forced to invest their money into something' (Interview 28,

Investment Bank, USD EM Credit Trading).

Investors did not look at particular financial assets in a vacuum, but make their

portfolio allocations on a 'relative value basis', choosing between different asset

classes based on the profits they offer balanced with their perceived riskiness

(Interview 34, Investment Management Company, Portfolio Manager). According to

interviews, during the early and mid 2000s, key 'high yielding' asset classes seen to

have a similar risk and return profile included EMs, US subprime mortgage backed

securities, and Eurozone peripheral bonds, among others. Following the bursting of

the US subprime bubble in end-2007, the poor performance of commodities after the

crisis, and the bursting of the peripheral Eurozone bubble in 2010, EMs remained as

one of the few relatively high yielding asset classes remained that were not perceived

as too risky (interviews).

Just as they had created negative feedback loops during the crisis period,

micro-level dynamics contributed to intensifying the mania by creating positive

feedback loops. Key data releases such as the US ISM manufacturing index showed

signs of improvement, as the US and China began to recover after massive stimulus

programs (Deutsche Bank 2011, 13). In keeping with the general investor sentiment,

ratings agencies upgraded a number of EM sovereign bonds to the key 'investment

grade' status between 2009 and 2012. As of September 2012, 53.5% of the bonds

included in JP Morgan's EMBIG index had an investment grade rating, compared to

only 1.7% at the index's inception in 1993 (Ratner 2009). Ratings agencies cited not

only improving fundamentals, but also the post-2009 capital inflows themselves as a

reason for the upgrades (Rowley 2012). In turn, the upgrades had further positive

feedback effects on investor sentiment, intensifying the self-fulfilling cycle of

mania25 .

As EM prices rose, even those asset managers who were sceptical that price

increases reflected fundamentals were forced to scale up their exposure, to prevent

clients from moving their money to competitor funds offering higher returns.

Dedicated EM bond funds increased their investments by going 'overweight' the

index, while new types of 'cross-over' investors, such as global bond funds, hedge

funds, and investment banks. For example, the EM bond allocations of Pacific

Investment Management Company LLC (PIMCO), the largest global bond fund,

which can be taken as representative of a large portion of the crossover market, shot

up after 2009 from about 3% of its total return fund, to nearly 14% in 2012 (IMF

2013, 16). News of these investors entering the market fuelled expectations for further

price increases. Lucrative profit opportunities encouraged new investors like non-

financial corporations to invest part of their reserves in EMs in order to boost profits.

A similar profit motive applied to investors like central banks, SWFs, and university

endowment funds, who took advantage of higher yielding EM assets to invest their

large amounts of reserves (Interview 31, Investment Bank, EM Sales).

It was not only short-term investors that played an important part in inflating

EM bond prices. Investors thought of as traditionally 'patient capital' with

diversification rather than profit motives, such as US, European and Japanese public

and private pension funds an insurance funds, were not immune to the profitable

opportunities offered by EM bonds either (Lee and Teo 2011). The distinction

between 'profit' and 'diversification' investment motivations became increasingly

blurred in a low interest rate environment, as pension and insurance funds became

involved in the desperate 'search for yield' abroad as they found they could no longer

meet their liabilities solely from investment in low yielding AE assets. For example

in 2012, the California Public Employees Retirement System (CALPERS), America's

biggest pension fund, needed to achieve an annualised target return of 7.75per cent, in

order to meet its lawful obligations to pensioners. For a fund of its size ($220 billion)

this could not be achieved by investing in domestic markets alone, when the 10-year

US Treasury yield was less than two per cent. (Lord and Dibiasio 2012). European

pension funds allocations to Asia alone were estimated to have gone from zero to five

per cent of the fixed-income portfolios (Lee and Teo 2011, Stewart 2012). EM

investments were made both directly, and through increased allocations to asset

managers. News of these large investors increasing their allocations sent positive

signals to the market, and attracted fresh capital (Interview 28, Investment Bank, USD

EM Credit Trading).

Investor perceptions of fundamentals during the mania

Table 1. Push factors and investor perceptions of domestic fundamentals

Source: Interviews, Factiva

Post-crisis reports on fundamentals dramatically reversed from 2008 as a

result of the push factors discussed above, and became even more positive than in the

pre-crisis period, especially after the start of the Eurozone crisis (table 1). This was

despite the fact that no major structural or policy changes occurred in major EM

countries between 2008 and 2013, let alone between 2008 and 2009. In many cases,

the same policies or macroeconomic indicators that had been looked at negatively

during the 2008 crisis when the push factors were negative (figure 2 points, such as

fiscal stimulus programs, were reinterpreted to be a sign of fundamental strength once

the push factors turned positive (figure 2). An analysis of investor views of

Financial'crisis'(2008) Eurozone'crisis'(201052013)

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fundamentals between 2009 and 2013 reveals a narrative of a dramatic structural

turnaround in EM economies due to better policies, permanently decreased EM risk,

and EM economies outperforming, and eventually catching up with, AEs, especially

after the second quarter of 2009.

Whereas during the panic phase in late 2008 investors were expecting slowing

growth in AEs to cause slower growth in EMs due to trade links, after 2009 investors

predicted a 'decoupling' of AE and EM growth rates (Foundation and Endowment

Money Management 2009). They emphasised EM countries strong trade surpluses,

even though AE growth continued to slow between 2009 and 2012 and EM countries'

export dependence on them had not lessened during this time. In fact, IMF data shows

that, although the aggregate category of 'emerging and developing countries' were

running a current account surplus, this was actually on average lower in the post-crisis

period than it had been before the crisis (see figure 4).

Figure 3. Aggregate current account balance and major debt indicators for EM

countries, 2005-13

Source: IMF online database, Balance of Payments Yearbook, World and

regional Aggregates; World Bank, International Debt Statistics. Note: Current account

data is for 'Emerging and Developing countries' category from IMF Balance of

Payments Yearbook. Debt data is for middle and low-income group aggregate in

which 2013 GNI per capita was $12,745 or less

Similarly, while investors had been predicting a decline in foreign exchange

reserves at the end of 2008, 'extensive' reserves were hailed as a key strength in EMs,

especially in Asia after 2009 (Nordic Region Pensions and Investment News 2012,

Ankarcrona 2012). According to 2010 report by Goldman Sachs, foreign exchange

reserves had helped to moderate 'country-risk', and were now 'perceived by investors

as more significant than a country's immediate fiscal situation' (Roman 2010). These

dramatic sentiment shifts occurred between 2008 and 2009 despite the fact that the

building up for foreign reserves was a much longer-term trend, beginning after 1997

Asian financial crisis (Ocampo, Kregel and Griffith-Jones 2007, 21-25).

0"

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8E+11"

0"

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25"

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2005" 2006" 2007" 2008" 2009" 2010" 2011" 2012" 2013"

External"debt"stock"to"GNI,"%"(LHS)"

Debt"service"to"exports,"%"(LHS)"

ShortJterm"to"external"debt"stocks,"%"(LHS)"

Current"account"surplus,"USD"Bn"(RHS)"

EM fiscal and debt ratios were also described as being very strong, and were

almost always analysed in relation to deteriorating fiscal conditions in AEs, especially

in Europe26. While fiscal stimulus programs such as those undertaken by Brazil and

China were criticised for leading to higher debt and longer term 'distortions' in 2008,

they became seen as contributing to growth in EMs after the turnaround in push

factors (Belaisch 2010). At the same time, similar fiscal spending was seen as leading

to higher indebtedness in AEs, echoed by the following statement from a PM at

Franklin Templeton: 'The tables have turned. Now the highly indebted are the

developed markets' (Hershey 2010) 27. According to a portfolio manager at the

Oppenheimer International Bond fund 28, even 'onetime fiscal 'basket cases' are

performing better than developed countries as a group these days... They're doing the

right things, running the right policies' (Hershey 2010). However, IMF data on major

debt indicators for EM countries show that not only was there no dramatic

improvement after 2008, but that there was a slight deterioration in some debt

indicators such as external debt to GNI and debt service to exports, in 2009, the year

when massive inflows began (see figure 3).

A belief that became widespread among investors during this time was that

EM countries were in a fundamentally better position approaching this global

recession than they had been in at any point in history, and so would be able to deal

with the fallout of the crisis much better. This was attributed to policy changes and

structural reforms including financial and trade liberalization, inflation-targeting

monetary regimes, floating exchange rates, and the implementation of fiscal rules,

which 'established the conditions for stability and success', according to the executive

vice president of PIMCO29 (Mamudi 2009). In 2009, the head of EMs at Aberdeen

Asset Management30 stated, 'We believe they [EMs] are more capable today of

dealing with perhaps the worst global financial crisis in our lifetime, due to stronger

balance sheets and more prudent macroeconomic policies' (Asian Investor 2009).

Some analysts went so far as to say that as a result of these developments, 'the days of

extreme emerging-market risk are coming to an end' (Mamudi 2009). The head of

EM equities at Schroders 31 went as far as to say that this 'major structural change'

was 'certainly as significant as the industrial revolution, and perhaps more so' (Evans

2010). This was despite the fact that most of these liberalisation reforms had occurred

in various EM countries between the 1990s and early 2000s, over a decade before the

2009 inflows began32.

Discussion and conclusion

This paper has used qualitative evidence, including detailed interviews with

market participants themselves, to argue that not only were push factors more

important in driving EM portfolio investment during and after the GFC, but also that

investors' perceptions of domestic fundamentals were influenced by the change in

push factors, causing them to become divorced from reality. The paper further shows

how the micro-foundations of investors' decision-making behaviour makes them even

more susceptible to push factors. This does not mean that domestic factors are

completely irrelevant, but rather that a degree of caution should be exercised when

analyzing investors' interpretations of them. Rather than taking investors'

interpretations at face value, it should be remembered that these are subjective

perceptions of the average opinion of the fundamentals.

Due to the micro-foundations, even if investors do not personally agree with

the average opinion of the domestic fundamentals, it is still rational for them to invest

according to others investors' behaviour, as this is what moves the market. Investors

were fully aware of the importance of push factors, even using various proxies to

measure their direction and effect, and were also aware the average opinion of the

domestic fundamentals might be incorrect. Due to the high level of global capital

mobility, even if the market view of the fundamentals turns out to be incorrect,

investors can easily reallocate their capital to some other asset class during the panic

phase, in order to maintain their short-term profits. Despite their different investment

strategies and mandates, all kinds of foreign investors were subject to speculative

behaviour, vulnerable to shorter-term market pressures, influenced by developments

in other asset classes, and most importantly, had the option to exit EM markets.

This paper's main argument, that push factors are fundamentally more

important than pull factors, even when investors do pay attention to the country

fundamentals, although not definitive, questions the prevailing wisdom in current IPE

literature, that financial markets can constrain or discipline EM government policy

through the market mechanism, even during periods of low international liquidity.

Outflows during the downturn are not primarily due to investors closely inspecting

country fundamentals, but due to a panicked exit, as developments elsewhere in the

world trigger capital flight, regardless of whether EM governments institute policies

according to investors' preferences. This does not mean that financial market

borrowing does not pose a constraint on EM governments33, but rather that this

constraint does not occur directly through the market mechanism, as implied in the

IPE literature, since market signals do not always convey information accurately, and

especially not during a crisis.

This paper contributes to a body of research that argues that reliance on

financial markets for international borrowing can leave developing country

governments at the mercy of factors beyond their control, subject to volatile

international capital flows, sometimes at massive economic and social costs. If push

factors are more important than pull factors in driving capital flows, this means that

government efforts to attract foreign capital or reduce borrowing costs through

implementing these investors' preferred policies may be ultimately futile. In

conjunction with a large body of literature on developing country financial crises and

boom and bust cycles34, this study points towards the need for some degree of capital

controls to counter the destabilizing effects of international financial markets

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!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !

1 'Emerging markets' and 'advanced economies' both correspond to the IMF classifications

given in: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/01/weodata/groups.htm

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !

2 In order for the 'financial market constraint' to work, governments also have to be

responsive to price changes in financial markets (Mosley 2003). This side of the story is

outside the scope of this paper, which only focuses on financial market reactions.

3 Hardie 2012 correctly emphasises that domestic EM investors are holding increasing

amounts of foreign currency denominated debt. Nevertheless, in the market in question,

foreign investors move their capital more often, and therefore, have more of an effect on

prices (Interviews) and therefore, will be the focus of this paper.

4 Seeking to mitigate exposure to risk from any asset class, country, or region over the long

term

5 Exceptions to this narrative include for Toporowski (2000), and Bonizzi (2017), which

highlight the role of pension funds in increasing finan cial market volatility in EMs.

6 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for making this point. The effect of pull factors on push

factors is much smaller. Domestic fundamentals of individual EMs could be expected to have

minimal real or sentiment based impact on global push factors (Interviews)

7!These clients included the largest hedge funds, asset management companies, pension

funds, and insurance funds, and private wealth managers, corporate non-financial companies,

and official investors such as central banks and sovereign wealth funds!

8 Which covers major news sources that interviewees identified as relevant including Reuters,

Dow Jones Newswires, Financial Times, Wall Street Journal, Euromoney, MarketWatch, and

Pension's Week

9 This paper focuses mainly on the hard currency sovereign bond market, and the 10-year

benchmark government bond because it best reflects market conditions (Mosley 2003).

10 Disaggregated data on investment flows by asset class and investor type is not readily

available. Such data exists in the EPFR database, which is proprietary and not available for

academic use. The IMF GFSR only provides data on investment flows by US mutual funds

to EMs.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !

11 The most detailed publicly available breakdown of EM investors is available from the IMF

(Arslanalp and Tsuda 2014) but does not differentiate within the foreign non-bank investors

category, or between foreign and local currency EM bonds. Hardie (2012) provides further

detail on the different types of EM investor, but quantitative estimates only for three

countries.

12 The terms mutual fund and asset manager are used interchangeably.

13 BIS estimates suggest that over 90% of mutual funds in EMs are open end (Miyajima and

Shim 2014, 20).

14 A dealer in financial market securities who is obliged to buy and sell securities at all times

in order to provide 'liquidity' to the market. They play the role of middleman, connecting

various 'counterparties' or investors to buy and sell securities from each other.

15 Market-making traders are different from 'proprietary' traders in investment banks, which

invest in order to make profits for the bank, similar to an in-house asset management

function. Regulatory moves have been taken to ban proprietary trading by investment banks,

which have commercial banking arms.

16 Here, the benchmark is the investors' reference point in constructing their portfolio, with

any deviations from the index reflecting a decision to overweight/underweight certain bonds

that they think will over/under perform.

17 Other criteria for inclusion and weighting include price, and tradability and liquidity of the

EM bonds.

18!Market capitalisation rather than total returns are used because this indicator gives

information on the price level, as well as the volume of investment.!

19 Even if the portfolio manager had a research team covering individual countries, the

ultimate decision maker still had to choose between a large number of countries, in a limited

amount of time: 'We do have some research guys, one part of their job is to talk to the 20

something banks that also produce research. Because I don't have time to understand the 20

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !

banks research… So in a way they help me to summarise' (Interview 33, Investment

Management Company, CEO)

20 CDS represent insurance against government default. A widening CDS spread is the result

of increased demand for the CDS, which indicates investors are expecting a higher probability

of default.

21 Canada's largest investment bank

22 This is consistent with the predictions of Prospect theory (i.e. one's higher propensity to

loss avoidance compared to pursuit of gains). Even though some investors believed that

fundamentals were more positive than was reflected in prices, they did not want to take the

risk of holding on to their investments in the hope that prices would go back up in the longer

term, because they were more averse to the short-term losses they would incur with such an

investment strategy. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for making this point.

23 One of the largest British investment managers specialised in EM.

24 Other events that resulted in negative risk sentiment (as shown by increases in the VIX

index in figure 2), including S&P's downgrade of the US from triple to double A+ in August

2011 due to the fiscal cliff (figure 2, point r), and various Greek and Irish bailouts in 2010 and

2011 (figure 2, point m, o, q) caused only brief outflows, with investors quickly going back

into EM due to the lack of investment alternatives.

25 For example, when Moody's upgraded Brazil to investment grade st atus in September

2009, even though this had widely been anticipated by the market, it led to additional inflows

as it widened the range of funds that were allowed to invest in it (Vyas 2009)

26 According to a report by Standard Chartered Bank26 , 'Asia' was seen as having especially

good fundamentals in this regard: 'If the financial market is looking to penalise fiscal

imprudence and reward countries with fiscal discipline, many Asian economies with low

fiscal deficits and debt should benefit' (Chatterjee 2010). Even 'Latin America', historically

known for debt crisis and sovereign defaults, was seen as one of the 'best examples of this

fundamental improvement in asset quality' (Belaisch 2010).

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !

27 By 2012, some investors were of the view that 'some of the [EM] countries are in even

better positions than the key developed markets' (Ankarcrona 2012).

28 A specialised bond fund that is part of OFI Global, an American asset management

company

29 The largest global bond investor, with a large presence in EMs.

30 A global investment group with a large presence in EMs.

31 One of the largest global asset management companies.

32 Furthermore, although these liberalization reforms, including the removal of capital

controls and financial market development, were seen as unconditionally positive, evidence

of their success has been mixed at best, especially in terms of promoting financial stability

(see Arestis and Glickman 2002 and Singh 2003 for a review).!

33 Over-reliance on financial market borrowing may create a situation where in the bust time,

because financial market borrowing becomes more difficult for emerging markets regardless

of domestic policy orientation, these countries may be forced to go back to financing sources

with hard conditionalities, such as the IMF, especially if sharp outflows cause a financial

crisis. International financial investors can also express their policy preferences to

governments more directly. Close networks between investment bankers and senior EM

politicians are common, as governments are bank clients for the issuing and marketing of

bonds on international markets and privatizations, and meetings are often held between large

institutional investors and policymakers.

34 See for example Grabel (1996), Palma (1998), Singh (1997; 2003), Chang Palma and

Whittaker (2001), Ocampo, Kregel and Griffith-Jones (2007), Kaltenbrunner and Panicera

(2018). !

... Gabor (2018a) argues that the characterisation of shadow banking as market-based finance advances the push for private finance as an engine of development in the Global South, or in her words, 'policy-engineered financialized globalisation via the shadow banking agenda' (Gabor 2018a). Critics of the World Bank's MFD approach outline several concerns: the detachment of financial flows from macroeconomic fundamentals (Bonizzi 2017, Naqvi 2018, the procyclicality and instability of financial flows (Gabor 2018a, 2018b, Grabel 2019), the extremely low participation of the private sector in infrastructure projects and its preference for 'bankable' opportunities over real needs in developing countries (Grabel 2019), and the subordinate position that emerging markets occupy in the global financial system owing to the international monetary system (Kaltenbrunner andPainceira 2018, Bonizzi andKaltenbrunner 2019). Criticisms of the MFD approach, while valid and important, miss a crucial part of the story: significant adjustments made by emerging markets to accommodate financial flows, and the costs that they bear to sustain 'development' finance. ...

... The rising prominence of the asset management industry in the landscape of institutional lending poses a challenge to recent attempts in comparative political economy to revive the concept of 'patient capital' (Deeg and Hardie 2016). The distinction drawn between patient capital (pension funds and insurance corporations) on the one hand, and short-term investors on the other (Maxfield 1998) does not hold in an age of asset management (Fichtner et al. 2017, Naqvi 2018, Gabor 2018a). 3 Unlike pension funds and insurance companies that are dictated by long-term liabilities, asset managers are driven by benchmarks and short-term expectations. ...

... Another EM bond index, the Citi Emerging Markets Government Bond Index (EMGBI) was launched in 2013. Bond market indices and benchmark driven investments play an important role in shaping emerging markets into financial assets (Naqvi 2018). ...

• Fathimath Musthaq

The private finance-led development model, promoted by international financial institutions, has faced a number of challenges. A major criticism is that the model promotes shadow banking, a system vulnerable to cyclical changes in liquidity. I argue that these criticisms do not go far enough because they fail to challenge the dominant understanding of shadow banking as a system of credit intermediation. In this paper, I propose an alternative analytical framework of shadow banking as a system that facilitates high risk-adjusted returns for institutional investors. This framework better clarifies the accommodations emerging markets make to sustain financial flows of which I outline two: (1) the provision of high-yielding financial assets, primarily through the issue of local-currency denominated sovereign bonds; and (2) the liquidity and insurance central banks provide, by drawing on expensive foreign exchange reserves, that enable investors to reap high risk-adjusted returns. The paper argues that rather than facilitating finance (or patient capital) to meet development objectives, a private finance-led model, by promoting the integration of emerging markets into the global shadow banking system, facilitates financial accumulation for global investors.

... Creditors fear that although governments announce their intention to "fix" their economies and reduce government expenditures, the short-term domestic political costs of economic adjustment will derail the announced reforms, increasing the risk of future default 2 on sovereign debt. Investors are called to assess the risk of lending to governments whose willingness to honor their debt obligations is not necessarily synonymous with their ability to do so (Gray, 2009;Hardie, 2011;Naqvi, 2019). The expected political costs of policy reform during economic crises increase investors' uncertainty about future economic policies, and consequently the political risk premium (Pástor & Veronesi, 2013). ...

... The expected political costs of policy reform during economic crises increase investors' uncertainty about future economic policies, and consequently the political risk premium (Pástor & Veronesi, 2013). In particular during financial crises when macroeconomic indicators deteriorate and the financial markets are volatile, investors rely disproportionately on heuristics and short-cuts (Gray, 2009;Naqvi, 2019). The 2008 financial and debt crisis stands as a reminder that this holds true even for developed, industrialized democracies with independent central banks (Bodea & Higashijima, 2017) and membership in the European Union (Barta & Makszin, 2020;Gray, 2013;Gray & Hicks, 2014). ...

How do prime ministers manage investors' expectations during financial crises? We take a novel approach to this question by investigating ministerial appointments. When prime ministers appoint technocrats, defined as non-partisan experts, they forgo political benefits and can credibly signal their willingness to pay down their debt obligations. This reduces bond yields, but only at times when the market is sensitive to expected repayments—that is, during crises. To examine the theory, we develop an event study analysis that employs new data on the background of finance ministers in 21 Western and Eastern European democracies. We find that investors reward technocratic appointments by reducing a country's borrowing costs. Consistent with the theory, technocratic appointments under crises predict lower bond yields. Our findings contribute to the literature on the interplay of financial markets and domestic politics.

... Creditors fear that although governments announce their intention to "fix" their economies and reduce government expenditures, the short-term domestic political costs of economic adjustment will derail the announced reforms, increasing the risk of future default 2 on sovereign debt. Investors are called to assess the risk of lending to governments whose willingness to honour their debt obligations is not necessarily synonymous with their ability to do so (Gray, 2009;Hardie, 2011;Naqvi, 2019). The expected political costs of policy reform during economic crises increase investors' uncertainty about future economic policies, and consequently the political risk premium (Pástor and Veronesi, 2013). ...

... The expected political costs of policy reform during economic crises increase investors' uncertainty about future economic policies, and consequently the political risk premium (Pástor and Veronesi, 2013). In particular during financial crises when macroeconomic indicators deteriorate and the financial markets are volatile, investors rely disproportionately on heuristics and short-cuts (Gray, 2009;Naqvi, 2019). The 2008 financial and debt crisis stands as a reminder that this holds true even for developed, industrialized democracies with independent central banks (Bodea and Higashijima, 2017) and membership in the European Union (Gray, 2013;Gray and Hicks, 2014; Barta and Makszin, 2020). ...

How do prime ministers manage investors' expectations during financial crises? We take a novel approach to this question by investigating ministerial appointments. When prime ministers appoint technocrats, defined as non-partisan experts , they forgo political benefits and can credibly signal their willingness to pay down their debt obligations. This reduces bond yields, but only at times when the market is sensitive to expected repayments-i.e., during crises. To examine the theory, we develop an event study analysis that employs new data on the background of finance ministers in 21 Western and Eastern European democracies. We find that investors reward technocratic appointments by reducing a country's borrowing costs. Consistent with the theory, technocratic appointments under crises predict lower bond yields. Our findings contribute to the literature on the interplay of financial markets and domestic politics.

... However, their rising economic power and weight in the global economy has not changed the subordinate position of DEEs in global financial markets. The clearest manifestation of this are the recurrent bouts of sharp exchange rate depreciations and financial instability, driven by conditions in international financial markets (Dafe 2020;Naqvi 2018). A stark recent example has been the COVID-19 sudden-stop in capital flows, as investors were flocking to 'safe', developed country assets (IMF, 2020). ...

The rise of the so-called Developing and Emerging Economies (DEEs) has been one of the most fundamental changes to the global economy in recent years. However, despite their rising economic power, DEEs remain in a subordinate position in global financial markets and the international monetary system, which shapes and constrains domestic economic actors' opportunities and exposes them to recurrent crises and vulnerabilities. This paper argues that International Financial Subordination (IFS) is a persistent and structural phenomenon related to DEEs' integration into a hierarchical world economy. To develop this argument we identify the main conceptual and methodological tools offered by Dependency Theory, Post-Keynesian economics, and Marxist scholarship which have contributed most to this new agenda. All three schools of thought provide important insights into the structural features of IFS, but also suffer from important limitations. Speaking to these limitations we offer six analytical axes around which to organize the future study of IFS: History; social relations of production; money; the state; non-state actors; and finally the importance of geography and spatial relations for understanding IFS.

... Here, financial and economic geographers as well political economists and critical development scholars could help situating remittances and diaspora capital and the attempts to encourage migrants to ever increase and formalise their 'developmental' contributions in hard currencies, within the existing and emerging literatures on currency hierarchies and financial subordination in the international monetary and financial systems (e.g. Alami, 2018;Kaltenbrunner and Painceira, 2018;Koddenbrock and Sylla, 2019;Naqvi, 2018). ...

• Vincent Guermond

The management of remittances represents a multi-billion industry that is concerned with how these flows can be tapped into by a wide range of institutional, state and private sector actors. This article advances the concept of remittance-scapes to signal the extensive work that is implicated in constructing remittances as development finance across four relational spaces of remittance management, namely, remittance preproduction-, production-, circulation- and reception-scapes. While human geographers have played a key role in unpacking many of the geographies of remittance management, I argue that thinking of remittances through the -scape provides new theoretical and empirical avenues to researching remittances.

... There is a vast, and growing, literature on the politics of financial regulation within and among countries in the core of the global financial system (see for instance Botzem, 2014;Büthe and Mattli, 2011;Haber and Calomiris, 2015;Helleiner, 2014;Kapstein, 1989;Lall, 2012;Lavelle, 2013;Oatley and Nabors, 1998;Perry and Nölke, 2006;Porter, 2005;Quaglia, 2019Quaglia, , 2014Singer, 2007;Tarullo, 2008;Underhill and Zhang, 2008;Young, 2012;Zysman, 1984). Scholarship on the politics of financial regulation in emerging economies and developing countries is equally insightful yet much less extensive and has tended to focus on the largest emerging and developing countries (Chey, 2014;Haggard and Lee, 1995;HamiltonHart, 2002;Hutchcroft, 1998;Knaack, 2017;Lavelle, 2004;Martinez Diaz, 2009;Naqvi, 2019;Walter, 2008). This reflects a tendency among scholars of international political economy, and international relations more broadly, to focus on countries with the largest economies on the grounds that they exert systemic influence over the global economy and the way it is governed (Drezner, 2008). ...

• Emily Jones

This chapter sets out the puzzle at the heart of this book: why do governments in many developing countries choose to regulate their banks on the basis of international standards they did not design, and which are costly to implement? Country case studies across Africa, Asia, and Latin America provide compelling evidence of the reputational, competitive, and functional incentives generated by financial globalization that lead regulators to adopt international standards. The chapter summarizes the book's core argument about the channels of regulatory interdependence between countries in the core and periphery of the global financial system, and the conditions under which we find that regulators to converge on, or diverge from, international banking standards.

• Alexandra O. Zeitz

Developing countries are often thought to be particularly exposed to the constraints of global markets. Facing scrutiny from foreign investors, why do developing-country governments enter international bond markets, especially when they can access cheaper finance from international financial institutions? I argue that borrowing governments' perception of market constraints depends on global liquidity. When bond markets are highly liquid, investors become more risk acceptant and governments perceive the political costs of borrowing to be lower, especially compared to the conditionality of concessional loans. I use data on the timing of bond issues and three case studies—Ethiopia, Ghana, and Kenya—to demonstrate that choices to issue debt were shaped by global liquidity. These findings nuance debates about how markets constrain governments, emphasizing that market constraints are conditional on systemic factors, including, global liquidity.

• Fathimath Musthaq

Drawing on Samir Amin's writings, this article proposes a contemporary form of dependency that manifests in the subordinate integration of developing countries into a financialised global economy. Using insights from the emergent financialisation literature, the article updates two themes in Amin's work: imperialist rent and the role of the peripheral state in perpetuating dependency in the global economy. In contemporary capitalism, imperialist rent is not limited to labour arbitrage but also includes financial arbitrage, and the peripheral state, rather than retreating, now actively manages the financial sphere. The article advances an updated understanding of dependency in the context of financialisation.

In the context of the pull-push debate on the weight that external or internal factors have in the behavior of capital flows, this article aims to empirically assess the extent to which the push factors linked to global liquidity determine the changes in the risk premium of a set of countries of the periphery in the period 1999-2019. We also test for a structural change in the premium risk series in 2003. We find that push factors play a predominant role (compared to pull factors) in explaining country-risk spreads changes in our selected set of peripheral countries and that there was indeed a substantial general reduction in country-risk premia after 2003. The results are in agreement both with the view that cycles in peripheral economies are subordinated to global financial cycles and also that such global conditions substantially improved compared to the 1990s.

• Bruno Bonizzi

This article contributes to the establishment of a framework for the analysis of international capital flows, with a specific focus on emerging markets. It is based on a "monetary" analysis of the economy, as well as on the works of Hyman Minsky and Jan Toporowski in particular. The key aspects of such an approach are the following. First, in a monetary economy, capital flows need to be understood as "flows of funds" that pertain to the realm of financial choices, as opposed to the traditional understanding of capital flows as based on "real" variables, such as saving and investment. A consequence of this is the need to focus on gross flows rather than capital flows. Second, liquidity preference considerations also apply at the international level, particularly in relation to the liquidity of emerging-market currencies that, in turn, depends on context-specific "Keynesian fundamentals." Third, the rise of institutional investors is the key historical development in the financial system, shaping the current reality of cross-border capital flows, including to emerging markets. I argue that institutional investors' liabilities, in light of the theories of Minsky and Toporowski, are one of the most important variables in determining these investors' portfolio choices. I synthesize these elements by defining capital flows to emerging markets as the demand for emerging-market assets by institutional investors. I propose a framework to categorize the various channels that guide this demand.

• Joscha Wullweber

Theories of performativity can enhance the study of global finance. Taking everyday financial practices seriously, they emphasise the potentially structuring effects and disciplinary nature of finance, and foreground the performative role of economics, financial models, and formulas. It has remained largely overlooked to date that the literature on the performativity of finance can be divided into two distinct approaches. 'Microperformativity' is the more actor-oriented approach, beginning its analysis with the exploration of agencements and their practices, or the examination of the social history of mathematical formulas in finance. 'Macroperformativity', in contrast, takes its point of departure from the social structure of finance itself, often in relation to national, international, or global power structures. Neither approach provides for an intermediary concept that more explicitly links the micro and macro level. Nor does either approach give adequate analytical consideration to social conflicts and power struggles. To fill these gaps, the paper applies poststructural hegemony theory to reconceptualise performativity as an articulatory logic which accounts for the transition of a particularity towards a universality within a framework of stratified hegemony. Framed accordingly, the concept of performativity accounts more strongly for the social and political processes, ruptures, contestations and contradictions in global finance.

• Annina Kaltenbrunner
• Juan Pablo Painceira

This paper analyses the recent changes in financial practices and relations in emerging capitalist economies (ECEs) using the example of Brazil. It argues that in ECEs these financial transformations, akin to the financialisation phenomena observed in Core Capitalist Economies (CCEs), are fundamentally shaped by their subordinated integration into a financialised and structured world economy. To analyse this subordinated financialisation, the paper draws on the framework of international currency hierarchies. It shows by means of two specific processes how the existence of a hierarchic international monetary system has changed the financial behaviour of domestic economic agents, and with it the structure of the financial system. The first process highlights the phenomenon of reserve accumulation and the changing behaviour of domestic banks. The second points to ECEs' sustained external vulnerability and its impact on the operations of Brazilian non-financial corporations. The paper also shows that not only were these financial transformations shaped by ECEs' subordinated financial integration, but also that it was these financialisation tendencies themselves which contributed to cementing existing hierarchies and further deepened existing asymmetries between ECEs and CCEs.

• Susan Strange

Adopting new and much more comprehensive concepts of both power and politics, the author develops a theoretical framework to show who really governs the world economy. He goes on to explore some of the non-state authorities, from mafias to the 'Big Six' accounting firms and international bureaucrats, whose power over who gets what in the world encroaches on that of national governments. The book is a signpost, pointing to some promising new directions for the future development of research and teaching in international political economy.

• J. Gray

This book argues that investor risk in emerging markets hinges on the company a country keeps. When a country signs on to an economic agreement with states that are widely known to be stable, it looks less risky. Conversely, when a country joins a group with more unstable members, it looks more risky. Investors use the company a country keeps as a heuristic in evaluating that country's willingness to honor its sovereign debt obligations. This has important implications for the study of international cooperation as well as of sovereign risk and credibility at the domestic level.

Source: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/328029693_Manias_Panics_and_Crashes_in_Emerging_Markets_An_Empirical_Investigation_of_the_Post-2008_Crisis_Period

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